https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7735-2109Dimensions of Wellbeing (with M. Simion Co-PI)
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Therme Group (approx. GBP 330,000).
Project Description
This project develops an integrated account of the nature of wellbeing along several dimensions, i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and physical wellbeing, in a way that is informed by work in contemporary applied ehtics, epistemology, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of psychologiy, philosophy of medicine and philosophy of biology. It also connects research in the philosophy of wellbeing with research in psychology and human enhancement in a way that adequately grounds each form of enhancement in the kind of normativity that is distinctive to it (i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and biological).
Project Outputs
Papers
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Therme Group (approx. GBP 330,000).
Project Description
This project develops an integrated account of the nature of wellbeing along several dimensions, i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and physical wellbeing, in a way that is informed by work in contemporary applied ehtics, epistemology, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of psychologiy, philosophy of medicine and philosophy of biology. It also connects research in the philosophy of wellbeing with research in psychology and human enhancement in a way that adequately grounds each form of enhancement in the kind of normativity that is distinctive to it (i.e. cognitive, emotional, social and biological).
Project Outputs
Papers
- Simion, M., Kelp, C. and Carter, A. In preparation. Wellbeing as the Function of Architecture.
- Simion, M. and Kelp, C. Forthcoming. 'Conceptual Innovation, Function First.' Noûs.
- Kelp, C. 2019. 'Utopie und Funktion.' Zamp Kelp, G. and Engel, L. eds. Luftschlosser: Ein Blick auf Haus-Rucker-Co/Post-Haus-Rucker. Leipzig: Spector.
A VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TRUST (with A. Carter (PI) and M. Simion)
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust (approx. GBP 250,000).
Project Description
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and how they do so. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
Project Outputs
Papers
Funding
This project is funded by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust (approx. GBP 250,000).
Project Description
One of the most serious challenges faced by philosophers of trust is to understand why, and under what circumstances, we should trust as opposed to distrust others and what they tell us. Even though philosophical theories of trust have offered insights into what trust is, they have yet to tell us what qualities make someone a good or bad truster, and how they do so. This project introduces virtue epistemology to address this issue for the first time. It offers a novel method for theorising about what dispositions trusting well requires, and it uses this method to explain why certain forms of skilled trusting are more valuable than others.
Project Outputs
Papers
- Kelp, C. and Simion, M. In preparation. What is trustworthiness. (Draft available on request)
KNOWLEDGE FIRST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
Funding
This project was funded by research grants from KU Leuven and Research Foundation Flanders (together approx. EUR 500,000).
Project Description
Knowledge and justified belief are among the most central notions in epistemology. While it is nearly universally agreed that knowledge entails justified belief, there is an ongoing debate over how, if at all, the two notions can be defined. Traditional epistemology takes justified belief to be the more fundamental of the two notions and ventures to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. One of the most promising accounts of justified belief that has been developed within the traditional framework is virtue epistemology, which analyses justified belief as belief that is the product of an epistemic ability, i.e. an ability to form true beliefs. An alternative to traditional epistemology that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent years is knowledge first epistemology. In contrast with its traditional cousin, knowledge first epistemology does not aim to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. Instead, it reverses the direction of analysis and ventures to define justified belief in terms of knowledge.
This project aims to develop a novel account of justified belief, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals of the project are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.
Project Outputs
Books
Papers
Funding
This project was funded by research grants from KU Leuven and Research Foundation Flanders (together approx. EUR 500,000).
Project Description
Knowledge and justified belief are among the most central notions in epistemology. While it is nearly universally agreed that knowledge entails justified belief, there is an ongoing debate over how, if at all, the two notions can be defined. Traditional epistemology takes justified belief to be the more fundamental of the two notions and ventures to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. One of the most promising accounts of justified belief that has been developed within the traditional framework is virtue epistemology, which analyses justified belief as belief that is the product of an epistemic ability, i.e. an ability to form true beliefs. An alternative to traditional epistemology that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent years is knowledge first epistemology. In contrast with its traditional cousin, knowledge first epistemology does not aim to define knowledge in terms of justified belief. Instead, it reverses the direction of analysis and ventures to define justified belief in terms of knowledge.
This project aims to develop a novel account of justified belief, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals of the project are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.
Project Outputs
Books
- Kelp, C. and Greco, J. eds. 2020. Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelp, C. 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Papers
- Kelp, C. 2017. 'Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.' Carter, A., Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B. eds. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. 2017. 'Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.' Mi, C., Sosa, E. and Slote, M. Moral and Intellectual Virtue in Western and Chinese Philosophy. London: Routledge.
- Kelp, C. 2016. 'Justified Belief: Knowledge-First Style.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93, 79-100. [link]
- Kelp, C. 2017. 'Lotteries and Justification.' Synthese 194, 1233-1244. [link]
- Kelp, C. 2019. 'How to Be a Reliabilist.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98, 346-74. [link] ,