Overview

I am philosopher of perception within the CSPE (Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience) at the University of Glasgow. I work primarily on the nature of perceptual experience or consciousness, on the nature of colour and colour perception, and on senses in which we directly versus indirectly perceive things. In recent months I've started examining the nature of perception within virtual and augmented realities, with recent research and public lectures on initial findings.

I co-organize two interdiscplinary seminar series: the PPN (Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience) seminar series and the Illusion of the Fortnight seminar series. Both feature cutting-edge research presentations throughout the academic year.

I also regularly organize in-person and online public engagement events with the CSPE, including at Being Human, European Researchers Night, Explorathon, Glagow Science Centre Lates, and Glasgow Science Festival. This can be in the form of public lecture and discussion, or featuring our ever-growing mobile "Mystery of Illusion" display.

On this page you'll find an overview of my various academic roles and activities. Please do not hesitate to get in touch.

For some immediate fun visit the CSPE's Illusions Index!

 


News

Project SENSOR grant awarded. We have been awarded roughly seven-hundred and fifty thousand pounds from AHRC & DFG to carry out a three year investigation into 'Sensory Engineering: Investigating Altered and Guided Perception and Hallucination'. Announcement here.

Latest paper: From immediate perception to basic belief

Recent publication: Colour variation without objective colour 

 

Recent talks

  • 12 February 2024, 'From immediate perception to basic belief', University of St. Andrews, Philosophical Society
  • 6 December 2023, 'Illusions exist: Naive realism is false' (w. F. Macpherson), Vision Research Conference, hosted by Centre for Vision Research, York University (Canada), 4-7 December.
  • 15 June 2023, 'Naive realism and illusion', Cognitive Science Seminar Series, Mind and Reason Seminar Series, University of York
  • 26 April 2023, 'Toward a theory of perceptual mediation', Conference in honour of José Bermúdez, Valencia, Spain
  • 17 March 2023, 'Naive realism and illusion', Cognitive Science Seminar Series, CUNY

 

 


Biography

Current positions at University of Glasgow:

Current positions outwith University of Glasgow:

Past appointments:

  • Scots Philosophical Association, Secretary/Director (2019-2024)
  • Philosophical Quarterly, Member of Executive Committee (2019-2024)
  • Visiting Fellow, University of Cambridge (2016)
  • Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh (2012)
  • Visiting Researcher, University of Glasgow (2012)

Research interests

I work primarily in philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind more broadly. I work in an interdisciplinary manner spanning philosophy, psychology and neuroscience and have sucessfully collaborated with artists and musicians on various aspects of perceptions.

Topics I work on include:

  • Perception in virtual and augmented realities
  • The metaphysics and epistemology of colour: esp. colour constancy and colour ontology
  • The distinction betweeen perceptual directness and indirectness
  • The nature of perceptual experience: phenomenology, qualia, sensation
  • Perceptual intentionality: esp. acquaintance, representation and the relations between them
  • Imagination: esp. sensory imaginings, relationship between imagination and perception
  • Sense-datum theory

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2024 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2003
Number of items: 25.

2024

Colburn, B. , Macpherson, F. , Brown, D. , Fearnley, L., Hodgson, C. and McDonnell, N. (2024) Policy and Practice Recommendations for Augmented and Mixed Reality. Documentation. University of Glasgow. (doi: 10.36399/gla.pubs.326686).

2022

Brown, D. H. (2022) Colour variation without objective colour. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3, 17.

2021

Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (Eds.) (2021) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY. ISBN 9780415743037

Brown, D. H. (2021) Colour constancy. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 269-284. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-20)

Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (2021) Introduction to the philosophy of colour. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 1-21. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-1)

2020

Brown, D. H. (2020) The steady pace of philosophy of colour. Itinera, 19, pp. 11-25. (doi: 10.13130/2039-9251/13877)

2019

Brown, D. (2019) Gert, Joshua, Primitive Colors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 237 pp. Philosophical Review, 128(3), pp. 348-352. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-7537322)[Book Review]

2018

Brown, D. (2018) Sensory substitution devices and behavioural transference: a commentary on recent work from the lab of Amir Amedi. In: Macpherson, F. (ed.) Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Series: Proceedings of the British Academy (219). British Academy by Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 122-129. ISBN 9780197266441

Brown, D. H. (2018) Infusing perception with imagination. In: Macpherson, F. and Dorsch, F. (eds.) Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 133-160. ISBN 9780198717881

Brown, D. H. (2018) Projectivism and phenomenal presence. In: Dorsch, F. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 226-251. ISBN 9780199666416

Brown, D. H. (2018) Color manipulation and comparative color: they’re not all compatible. In: Andrews, K. and Beck, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: London, pp. 76-86. ISBN 9781138822887

2017

Brown, D. H. (2017) Colouring for and colour relationalism. Analysis, 77(2), pp. 433-449. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anx025)

2016

Brown, D. H. (2016) A study in deflated acquaintance knowledge: sense-datum theory and perceptual constancy. In: Costreie, S. (ed.) Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. Series: The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, 80 (80). Springer: Cham, pp. 99-125. ISBN 9783319242125 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_5)

2015

Brown, D. H. (2015) Colour layering and colour relationalism. Minds and Machines, 25(2), pp. 177-191. (doi: 10.1007/s11023-015-9363-0)

2014

Brown, D. (2014) Colour layering and colour constancy. Philosophers' Imprint, 14(15), pp. 1-31.

2012

Frappier, M., Brown, D. and DiSalle, R. (Eds.) (2012) Analysis and Interpretation in the Exact Sciences: Essays in Honour of William Demopoulos. Series: The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science. Springer. ISBN 9789400725812

Brown, D. H. (2012) Losing grip on the world: from illusion to sense-data. In: Raftopoulos, A. and Machamer, P. (eds.) Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 68-95. ISBN 9780521198776 (doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511979279.004)

2011

Brown, D. H. (2011) The content of perception. Metascience, 20(1), pp. 165-168. (doi: 10.1007/s11016-010-9451-y)[Book Review]

2010

Brown, D. H. (2010) Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates. Philosophical Studies, 148(1), pp. 69-78. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0)

2009

Brown, D. H. (2009) Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 377-394. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9237-x)

2008

Brown, D. (2008) Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference. Dialectica, 62(3), pp. 323-334. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01157.x)

Brown, D. H. (2008) Empiricism and Experience by Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly, 58(230), pp. 180-185. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.547_4.x)[Book Review]

2007

Brown, D. H. (2007) Review of N. Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective. Philosophical Psychology, 20(3), pp. 402-406. (doi: 10.1080/09515080701362650)[Book Review]

2006

Brown, D. H. (2006) On the dual referent approach to colour theory. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(222), pp. 96-113. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00431.x)

2003

Brown, D. H. (2003) Meaning and Rigorization. In: Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 30 May - 1 Jun 2003, pp. 95-102.

This list was generated on Sat Oct 12 16:51:17 2024 BST.
Number of items: 25.

Articles

Brown, D. H. (2022) Colour variation without objective colour. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 3, 17.

Brown, D. H. (2020) The steady pace of philosophy of colour. Itinera, 19, pp. 11-25. (doi: 10.13130/2039-9251/13877)

Brown, D. H. (2017) Colouring for and colour relationalism. Analysis, 77(2), pp. 433-449. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anx025)

Brown, D. H. (2015) Colour layering and colour relationalism. Minds and Machines, 25(2), pp. 177-191. (doi: 10.1007/s11023-015-9363-0)

Brown, D. (2014) Colour layering and colour constancy. Philosophers' Imprint, 14(15), pp. 1-31.

Brown, D. H. (2010) Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates. Philosophical Studies, 148(1), pp. 69-78. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0)

Brown, D. H. (2009) Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 377-394. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-008-9237-x)

Brown, D. (2008) Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference. Dialectica, 62(3), pp. 323-334. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01157.x)

Brown, D. H. (2006) On the dual referent approach to colour theory. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(222), pp. 96-113. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00431.x)

Book Sections

Brown, D. H. (2021) Colour constancy. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 269-284. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-20)

Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (2021) Introduction to the philosophy of colour. In: Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY, pp. 1-21. ISBN 9780415743037 (doi: 10.4324/9781351048521-1)

Brown, D. (2018) Sensory substitution devices and behavioural transference: a commentary on recent work from the lab of Amir Amedi. In: Macpherson, F. (ed.) Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Series: Proceedings of the British Academy (219). British Academy by Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 122-129. ISBN 9780197266441

Brown, D. H. (2018) Infusing perception with imagination. In: Macpherson, F. and Dorsch, F. (eds.) Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 133-160. ISBN 9780198717881

Brown, D. H. (2018) Projectivism and phenomenal presence. In: Dorsch, F. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 226-251. ISBN 9780199666416

Brown, D. H. (2018) Color manipulation and comparative color: they’re not all compatible. In: Andrews, K. and Beck, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: London, pp. 76-86. ISBN 9781138822887

Brown, D. H. (2016) A study in deflated acquaintance knowledge: sense-datum theory and perceptual constancy. In: Costreie, S. (ed.) Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. Series: The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science, 80 (80). Springer: Cham, pp. 99-125. ISBN 9783319242125 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_5)

Brown, D. H. (2012) Losing grip on the world: from illusion to sense-data. In: Raftopoulos, A. and Machamer, P. (eds.) Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 68-95. ISBN 9780521198776 (doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511979279.004)

Book Reviews

Brown, D. (2019) Gert, Joshua, Primitive Colors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 237 pp. Philosophical Review, 128(3), pp. 348-352. (doi: 10.1215/00318108-7537322)[Book Review]

Brown, D. H. (2011) The content of perception. Metascience, 20(1), pp. 165-168. (doi: 10.1007/s11016-010-9451-y)[Book Review]

Brown, D. H. (2008) Empiricism and Experience by Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly, 58(230), pp. 180-185. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.547_4.x)[Book Review]

Brown, D. H. (2007) Review of N. Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective. Philosophical Psychology, 20(3), pp. 402-406. (doi: 10.1080/09515080701362650)[Book Review]

Edited Books

Brown, D. H. and Macpherson, F. (Eds.) (2021) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Series: Routledge handbooks in philosophy. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY. ISBN 9780415743037

Frappier, M., Brown, D. and DiSalle, R. (Eds.) (2012) Analysis and Interpretation in the Exact Sciences: Essays in Honour of William Demopoulos. Series: The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science. Springer. ISBN 9789400725812

Research Reports or Papers

Colburn, B. , Macpherson, F. , Brown, D. , Fearnley, L., Hodgson, C. and McDonnell, N. (2024) Policy and Practice Recommendations for Augmented and Mixed Reality. Documentation. University of Glasgow. (doi: 10.36399/gla.pubs.326686).

Conference Proceedings

Brown, D. H. (2003) Meaning and Rigorization. In: Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Mathematics, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 30 May - 1 Jun 2003, pp. 95-102.

This list was generated on Sat Oct 12 16:51:17 2024 BST.

Grants

  • Nov. 2023 Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)/ Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) grant for project SENSOR, Sensory Egineering: Investigating Altered and Guided Perception and Hallucination. I am PI for AHRC component, Sascha Fink (Magdeberg) is PI for DFG component. Co-Is are F. Macpherson and J. Lyons. Project runs from January 2024 - December 2026. (~£750,000)
    • Announcement here.
  • Sept. 2021 Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) Research Network Grant for Augmented Reality: Ethics, Perception and Metaphysics. Co-organizer with B. Colburn, F. Macpherson, and N. McDonnell. (£19,747.43)
  • June 2019 Scots Philosophical Association grant for Unity of Perception workshop (£1500)
  • June 2018 Scots Philosophical Association grant for Depiction, Pictorial Experience and Vision Science workshop (£1500).
  • Mar. 2018 British Society of Aesthetics Conference grant for Depiction, Pictorial Experience and Vision Science (£5000)
  • Nov. 2017 Mind Association Conference grant for Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science workshop (£1500)
  • June 2017 Scots Philosophical Association grant for Particularity of Perception workshop (£1500)
  • June 2016 Special Research Grant from Associate Vice-President Research at BU for You Can’t See Through White ($3,000)
  • Sept. 2015 Templeton Foundation grant, via New Directions in the Study of Mind Project at Cambridge University, for Colour primitivism and non-reductive minds (£14,000)
  • Jan. 2015 Brandon University Research Committee (BURC) grant for collaborative artistic project You Can’t See Through White with Ben Davis (visual artist) and Eric Platz (percussionist) ($4,000)
  • Nov. 2014 Special Research Grant from Vice-President Academic at BU for You Can’t See Through White pilot ($3,500)
  • Mar. 2012 Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) International Exchange Programme Grant to be Visiting Scholar at University of Glasgow Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience, Philosophy Department, Sept.-Dec. 2012 (£3,000)
  • Apr. 2010 Awarded 2-year BURC research grant ($4,000)
  • Apr. 2009 Awarded special research grant from VP Academic at Brandon University. ($3,000)
  • Oct. 2007 BURC travel grant ($500)
  • Oct. 2005 University of Minnesota research grant ($1,000)
  • Oct. 2005 University of Minnesota teaching enhancement grant ($750).
  • Apr. 2003 Ontario Graduate Scholarship ($16,000).
  • 2000 - 2003 Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Ph.D. grant – 3 years funding ($48,000).

Supervision

I am happy to supervise Masters and PhD students and take on postdocs in philosophy of mind, perception, psychology, colour and related areas. I also welcome applications from students studying elsewhere who would like to spend time as a visiting research student working with me and/or at the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience. Please see the philosophy postgraduate webpages for details of postgraduate degrees that we offer and funding or for how to apply to be a visiting student.

 Potential supervisory topics

  • Perception in virtual and augmented realities:metaphysics, epistemology, experience or consciousness
  • Colour (and other sensory qualities): metaphysics and epistemology of colour, colour phenomena, error in colour experience
  • Theories of perception: representationalism, naive realism, sense-datum theory, Bayesianism, predictive coding
  • Imagination: sensory imagination, the relation between imagination and perception
  • Perceptual experience: phenomenology, qualia, sensations
  • Perceptual directedness: perceptual acquaintance, representation in perception, indirect perception
  • Relation between cognition and perception

I am happy to discuss possible projects or to suggest specific ones that are ripe for a contemporary philosophical treatment. Please don't hesitate to write with queries.

Current Graduate students

  • Harber, Jacob
    What is the difference between the conscious nature of mental imagery, perception, and other sensory states (such as dreaming and hallucinating)?
  • Johnson, Kevin
    Two Types of Consciousness and the ‘Initial Style’ of James Joyce’s Ulysses: Mapping Narrative Techniques onto Philosophy of Consciousness
  • Reilly, John
    Metaphor, Isomorphism and the Explanation of Representational Content

Past Supervisions

  • 2019-2022 Steven Broadrick, PhD, "Predictive Processing and Colour" (first supervisor)
  • 2017-2021 Raul Morales, PhD, "Naive Realism and the Nature of Hallucination" (secondary supervisor)
  • 2018-2019 Sean Carrothers, MPhil, "Is Pain Necessarily Unpleasant?" (joint first supervisor)

Teaching

Regular teaching

  • MSc Philosophy of Mind A or B - 6 x 2hr lectures
  • SH10 Philosophy of Perception (4th year undergraduate) - 16 lectures
  • JH7 Philosophy of Mind (3rd year undergraduate) - 8 lectures (half of course)
  • Philosophy of Science Module in 2B (2nd year undergraduate) - 6 lectures